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FOOD SAFETY POLICY:
PROBLEMS, PERSPECTIVES, AND POSSIBILITIES
Sherwin Gardner*l***
Timothy Larkin **
INTRODUCTION
The evolution of federal food (and drug) safety legislation can be characterized
as a series of forcing events producing major advances followed by comparatively
lengthy periods of quiescence. Thus, after many years of inconclusive debate
and study in Congress, the 1906 Food and Drugs Act1 came about largely
because Upton Sinclair's novel, The Jungle, with its graphic descriptions of
unhygienic meat processing practices, shocked the American people into
demanding action. 2 As Sinclair later put it, "I aimed at America's heart, and
''3
instead hit it in the stomach.
The latest forcing event might well be described as what happens when a
decision aimed at American's brain ends up by hitting it in its sweet tooth.
This event consists of the consequences of the March 9, 1977, announcement
by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) of its intention to ban saccharin
from human food based upon evidence that the sweetener was an animal
4
carcinogen.
This announcement produced an unprecedented outpouring of public
disapproval, 5 leading to a congressionally mandated moratorium on FDA action
against saccharin. 6 More importantly, however, the uproar concerning saccharin
focused attention on the whole structure and philosophical basis of the nation's
food safety policy. National attention to food safety standards was reinforced
in July, 1978 by the prospect of regulatory action against nitrites, widely used

*Sherwin Gardner was formerly the Deputy Commissioner of Food and Drugs from June 1972 to December
1979. He is now Vice President for Science and Technology with the Grocery Manufacturers of America,
Inc. (GMA).
**Timothy Larkin is a special assistant to the Commissioner of the FDA.
***I wish to acknowledge the contributions of my colleagues, Stuart Pape and Richard Cooper, former
chief counsel for FDA, whose invaluable analyses helped in shaping my views. I also wish to express my
appreciation to Richard Merrill and Peter Hutt, former chief counsels of FDA, for their review of this
article. This acknowledgment does not imply the agreement of others with the material presented or the
validity of the technical content; the views expressed are my own and those of Mr. Larkin and do not
necessarily reflect those of FDA or of my current employer, GMA. Sherwin Gardner
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, § 7, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (repealed 1938).
J. Young, The Medical Messiahs 34 (1967).
Regier, The Struggle for Federal Food and Drugs Legislation, I Law and Contemp. Prob. 1, 9 (1933)
and Sinclair, "What Life Means To Me," Cosmopolitan, Oct. 1906, at 594.
42 Fed. Reg. 19,996 (1977).
Consumer Reports, July 1977, at 410 for a representative sample.
21 U.S.C.A. 343(o) and (p)(West Supp. 1978). The moratorium expired in May 1979; another bill
extending the moratorium until June 30, 1981 was passed in the House of Representatives (H.R.
4453, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Senate action has not been taken.
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as a preservative to prevent meat7 from becoming dangerously tainted with the
toxin produced by C. botulinum.
The Saccharin Study and Labeling Act directed the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare to arrange for separate studies of the safety and
benefits of saccharin and, more importantly, also to explore the more fundamental
question of the adequacy of current laws regulating food safety. The Institute
of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences completed its studies on
both subjects on November 6, 1978 and March 1, 1979.8
The forcing events of the saccharin decision together with the debate over
the introduction of legislation concerning nitrites were intensified by certain
features of the political environment and by a series of other actions regarding
food and food additives, many of which were also controversial.
There is an ongoing debate about the value to society of regulation,
including questions about whether regulation is not subjecting society to greater
cost than the benefits of such regulation warrant. 9 There are two kinds of
regulation: economic and health; the latter encompassing environmental,
occupational, and product safety regulations, including those products regulated
by FDA. As pointed out by Alfred E. Kahn in a speech to the American Bar
Association, health regulation is different in principle from economic regulation:
No one in his or her right mind could argue that the competitive market
takes care of protecting the environment. In the presence of such externalities,
and in the absence of regulation, competition becomes rivalry in the degradation
of the environment, unless the government intervenes, producers and consumers
will have no incentive to hold down the costs that they can slough off to
others. As a result, they will refrain from making any expenditures, no matter
how small, to cut down on those costs, no matter how large. Although there
are some important differences in the cost of occupational and product safety,
the fact remains that we as a society are unwilling to leave those to the
operation of the free market. 10
The national debate about the value of regulation in our society carried
on in newspaper editorials and magazine articles is frequently at a high level
of generalization where such distinctions are not made. The overall result is
to intensify the pressure for a legitimate and long overdue evaluation of public
policy in the food safety area. In regard to the form of regulation exercised
by the FDA, the perception that their regulation is out of touch with the real
world is heightened by the realization that there are major inconsistencies in
the way the law regulates various substances. 11
7.

8.

9.

10.
1I.

Due to the health risks attendant upon any sudden elimination of nitrates, on March 30, 1979, the
Carter Administration sent to Congress proposed legislation to establish a one year moratorium on
any action to ban nitrates. Under the terms of the proposal, should nitrate be shown not to be safe,
the moratorium would be followed by a gradual nitrate phaseout, contingent on development of
commercially feasible alternative preservatives. Congress has not acted on the proposal.
Committee for a Study on Saccharin and Food Safety Policy, Institute of Medicine and the National
Research Council, Assembly of Life Sciences, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., Part
I, Saccharin: Technical Assessment of Risks and Benefits (1978): Part II, Food Safety Policy:
Scientific and Societal Considerations (1979).
Lyons, Up-to-Date Technology, Out-of-Date Regulations, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1978; Porter, Big
Brother Approach Ends in Consumer Protection, Wash. Star, Dec. 24, 1978; Rattner, Regulating the
Regulators, N.Y. Times Mag., June 19, 1979; Weidenbaum, Measuring the Costs of Regulation, Wash.
Post, Feb. 3, 1979; Schuck, Regulation: Asking the Right Questions, Nat. J., April 4, 1979 at 711;
125 Cong. Rec. S. 3327 (daily ed. March 26, 1979) (Presidential Message to Congress on Regulation
Reform).
Remarks of Alfred E. Kahn before the American Bar Association, "The Role of Regulatory Reform
in an Anti-Inflation Program," Dallas, Texas (August 15, 1979).
Joyce C. Lashof, "Food Safety at the Crossroads," keynote speech to Annual Meeting of the Food
Safety Council, Washington, D.C. (December 14, 1978).
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Thus, it seemed anomalous, if not absurd, for the Food and Drug
Administration to propose disrupting commerce and personal habits to ban a
popular food additive regarded as a weak carcinogen while contemplating no
General of
such action in regard to what most people, including the Surgeon
12
the U.S., consider to be a strong carcinogen, cigarette smoking.
Meanwhile, there were other FDA actions regarding food and food additives
which often revolved around obscure or complex problems or dealt with possible
threats to health rather than actualized ones (as most FDA actions do), and
appeared to subject industry to major loss without tangible compensating
gain. 13 These actions gave support to those who questioned either the logic
being followed by the Agency in carrying out the requirements of food safety
policy as required by law 14 or indicated that if FDA actions were indeed a
logical extension of law, then these actions were in fact a regulatory reductio
ad absurdum and therefore, clearly indicating that the law itself, in regard
to food safety policy, should be changed. The purpose of this article is to
define the scope of the problem, to review options available for food safety
policies, and to suggest which among them might better satisfy contemporary
goals of rationality and safety.
DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

Because many of the most controversial proposals or actions by the FDA
resulted from scientific studies revealing that various substances possess
carcinogenic capacity, the primary target of suggestions concerning changes in
food safety policy has been the so-called Delaney Clause, named for Congressman
James J. Delaney of New York, Chairman of. a House Committee created as
a result of House Resolution 207. The Delaney Clause, which called for
12.

13.

14.

On its face, this is a logical and reasonable question to explore. The fact that tobacco and foods are
treated differently in our laws answers why no action is taken by the FDA against tobacco, but does
not explain why our laws are designed this way or whether they should be more alike - one way or
the other. As a matter of fact, FDA can regulate cigarettes - as a drug, if health claims are made
by the manufacturer. For the most recent decision regarding the FDA's denial of a petition to have
the FDA assert jurisdiction over cigarettes containing nicotine (or nicotine separately) as a "drug,"
see Action on Smoking v. Califano, (1978-79 Transfer Binder) Food Drug Cos. L. Rep. (CCH)
paragraph 38, 219 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 1979) appeal docketed, No. 79-1397 (D.C.Cir. Apr. 18,1979).
"Background noise" from a number of continuing controversies added to the feeling that all was not
well with the way the nation had designed its food safety policy. See particularly the matters of
cyclamates and Aspartame, both artificial sweetners. Cyclamate was initially banned by the FDA in
1970, but reapproval hearings and their sequalae continued in late 1979. Aspartame was initially
approved by 1974, but objections were raised about whether it induces brain tumors in rats or
contributes to mental retardation, brain damage or other undesirable effects. The FDA decided then
to convene a Board of Inquiry (a mechanism designed to help the FDA Commissioner resolve scientific
issues; it is an alternative to a formal evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge) but
postponed it when an investigation of Searle scientific studies on some drugs raised questions about
the reliability of other studies conducted by/for the company, including the Aspartame studies. In
December 1975, the FDA stayed Aspartame's approval pending a comprehensive review of the studies,
and put in abeyance its intention to convene the Board of Inquiry. Since the review has been completed,
the FDA decided to go ahead with the Board of Inquiry proceedings. Another controversy revolved
around the question of whether minute traces of the cancer-causing substance, nitrosamine, are found
in some malt beverages and Scotch whiskey. Finally, there has been an ongoing and highly technical
controversy surrounding the decision by the FDA in September 1977 that acrylonitrile copolymer
beverage bottles are food additives and could not be approved as safe under Section 409 of the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act.
that a one-molecule-hit-on-one-cell can cause irreversible cancer. If
There are some who say " ...
that were so we would all be doomed, because unless Avogadro was weak with numbers, I estimate
that if you were to rid all food of any carcinogens, down to the threshold of analytical detection, say,
one part per trillion, every meal would still expose you to several trillions of carcinogenic molecules
or ions. That, my friends, is one of the great benefits of knowing something about Introductory
Chemistry. It compels you to abandon the concept of an Absolute Zero Risk, and brings you to the
only intellectually honest proposition: Relative Risk." Congressman Martin, James G., from a speech
delivered to the 22nd Educational Conference of the Food and Drug Law Institute, Washington, D.C.,
(December 5, 1978).
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investigation of the use of chemicals in food products was introduced on May
9, 1949.15
Hearings held by the Delaney Committee ultimately resulted in three laws:
17
the Pesticide Residues Amendment, 16 the Food Additives Amendment
and the Color Additive Amendment 18 to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
(FD&C Act). 19 The Food Additives Amendment contained an absolute prohibition
against approval of a food additive by the FDA if that additive had been
shown to be carcinogenic. 20 This is what is ordinarily meant when non-experts
refer to the Delaney Clause. The fact is there are actually three separate
Delaney Clauses, two of which prohibit, on slightly different grounds, approval
of food and color additives that are cancer causing; the other, contained in
the Animal Drug Amendments of 1968,21 prohibits approval of cancer-causing
drugs in food producing animals. The latter clause, however, contains a
qualification designed not to ban carcinogens completely, but to establish the
conditions under which they may be used.
Critical analyses of food safety policy seem, generally, to follow an interesting
metamorphosis, beginning with an initial concentration on the multi-dimensional
Delaney Clause as the root of the problem. 22 Finally, analyses end with a
realization that modification or elimination of any or all of the Delaney Clauses
can have no major impact on, or change the course of, food safety policy;
indeed, the Delaney Clauses have rarely served as the basis for FDA decisions
regarding additives 23 and even then have been a vehicle of convenience rather
than necessity. FDA action against carcinogenic substances is fully provided
for by "general safety standards" of the FD&C Act.
These standards, to which the Delaney Clauses are appended, requires that
food and color additives and animal drug residues be shown to be safe before
they may lawfully be added to food. Under the general safety standard, 24 a
substance cannot be approved for use in food unless the FDA is satisfied that
it has been shown that the additive can be used with a "reasonable certainty
of no harm to consumers." This standard is the definition of safety established

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

24.

H.R. Res. 207, 81st Cong., Ist Sess., 95 Cong. Rec. 5927 (1949).
21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 342, 346 (1976).
21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 331, 346, 348 (1976).
21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 331, 333, 342, 343, 346, 351, 352, 361, 362, 371, 376 (1976).
21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et. seq. (1976), hereafter cited as FD&C Act.
" . . . no additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is found to induce cancer when ingested by man
or animal, or if it is found, after tests which are appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of food
" 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1976).
additives, to induce cancer in man or animal ....
21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 322, 331, 342, 351, 352, 357, 360(b), 381, 392 (1976).
Thomasson, Delaney Clause is the Culprit, Wash. Post., July 1, 1979 (reprinted from At. Monthly,
June, 1975).
"In practice, the FDA has rarely relied solely on the Delaney Clause in attempting to ban or restrict
exposure to carcinogenic good ingredients. Between the early 1950's and 1977, the agency forbade the
use of 14 food constituents on the grounds that they caused cancer in laboratory animals. (In only
three instances-those involving Flectol H, Chronaline, and saccharin--did it expressly invoke the
Delaney Clause.) This total does not include more recent FDA actions dealing with chloroform and
acrylonitrile." Footnote 51 of a detailed analysis of food safety issues by Richard A. Merrill (formerly
Chief Counsel of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and now Daniel Caplin Professor of Law,
University of Virginia School of Law) in Regulating Carcinogens in Food: A Legislators Guide to
the Food Safety Provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 171
(1978).
"No such regulation (authorizing use of a food additive) shall issue if a fair evaluation of the data
before the Secretary - (A) fails to establish that the proposed use of the food additive, under the
" (There follows the
conditions of use to be specified in the regulation, will be safe: Provided....
Delaney Clause cited in note 18 supra.) 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1976).
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by the legislative history. Since the Delaney Clause was first enacted in 1958,
the FDA has consistently maintained that it would not be possible to conclude
with "reasonable certainty" that a substance will cause no harm if it has been
shown to cause cancer in man or laboratory animals. Hence, as a general
matter, a substance shown to cause cancer in animals would not comport with
the general safety standard even if there were no Delaney Clause. While it
may be argued that the existence of the Delaney Clause virtually eliminates
the Agency's option not to act on carcinogens, it should be pointed out that,
in a sense, the general safety standard is more rigorous than the Delaney
Clause. The Delaney Clause requires a finding that a substance actually causes
cancer, but it is possible for FDA to ban, and the Agency has in fact banned,
substances under the general safety standard that were only suspected of
25
causing cancer.
The example of Oil of Calamus, 26 illustrates an issue that often confuses
discussions of the law and, particularly, of the food additive provisions of the
law. This stems from the fact that the statute defines food additives in a
highly restrictive way. 27 In fact the Act applies to seven categories of substances
added purposely or accidentally to foods, but only one of these is classified
by the Act as a "food additive." In addition to substances classified as food
additives under this definition, these categories are: environmental contaminants;
GRAS (generally recognized as safe) substances; prior sanctioned substances;
color additives; animal drugs and feed additives; and pesticide residues on raw
commodities.
Environmental contaminants, a category created administratively by FDA
includes not only industrial chemicals that accidentally get into food, such as
polybrominated biphenyls, and industrial effluents, such as mercury and
polyclorinated biphenyls, but also substances of biological origin that are
by-products of food production or storage, such as the potent liver carcinogen,

25.

26.
27.

Prior to the enactment of the original Delaney Clause, two artificial sweeteners thought to be carcinogens
- Dulcin and P-4000 - were removed from the food supply because the FDA regarded them as
poisonous substances which have no place in any food." 15 Fed. Reg. 321 (1950). Then, in March
1954, the FDA announced that any food containing coumarin added as such, or as a constituent of
tonka beans or tonka extract, would be regarded as adulterated on the grounds that it contained an
added poisonous or deleterious substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(1) (1976). This action,
too, was based upon a finding that coumarin is carcinogenic. 19 Fed. Reg. 1239 (1954). Other actions
concern, respectively: DES in poultry (Bell v. Goddard, 336 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1966)); Safrole (25
Fed Reg. 1241 (1960); Oil of Calimus (33 Fed. Reg. 6967 (1968)); Cyclamate (34 Fed. Reg. 17063
(1969)); DES in cattle and sheep (37 Fed. Reg. 3060 (1972) and 37 Fed. Reg. 15426 (1972));
Diethylpyrocarbonate (38 Fed. Reg. 10116 (1973) and 38 Fed. Reg. 33072 (1973)); Mercaptins (38
Fed. Reg. 9077 (1973)); Violet No. 1 (41 Fed. Reg. 5823 (1976)); FD&C Red No. 2 (41 Fed Reg.
15029 (1976)).
33 Fed. Reg. 6967 (1968).
As stated in 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1976): "The term 'food additive' means any substance the intended
use of which results or may reasonably be expected to result, directly or indirectly, in its becoming
a component or otherwise affecting the characteristics of any food (including any substance intended
for use in producing, manufacturing, packing, processing, preparing, treating, packaging, transporting,
or holding food; and including any source of radiation intended for any such use), if such substance
is not generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate
its safety, as having been adequately shown through scientific procedures (or, in the case of a substance
used in food prior to January 1, 1958, through either scientific procedures or experience based on
common use in food) to be safe under the conditions of its intended use; except that such term does
not include - . . . (3) a color additive; or (4) any substance used in accordance with a sanction or
approval granted prior to the enactment of this paragraph . . . pursuant to this Act, the Poultry
(emphasis added)
Products Inspection Act . . . or the Meat Inspection Act of March 4, 1907 .
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aflatoxin. Indeed, the FD&C Act expressly provides authority for tolerance
setting for substances meeting the standard of Section 406; risk-benefit analysis
is implied by the authority to limit the amounts of substances to the extent
they are required or can't be avoided "to such an extent as [the Secretary]
finds necessary for the protection of public health . . . "28
The statutory definition of "food additive" excludes any ingredient that is
generally recognized as safe (GRAS). This limitation of GRAS substances
was made because Congress sought to free the FDA and manufacturers from
being required to prove the safety of substances already considered harmless
because of past extensive use with no harmful effect. There are actually two
classes of GRAS ingredients: those generally recognized by experts as safe
based on their common use in food prior to 1958, and those generally recognized
as safe on the basis of toxicological tests, regardless of whether those tests
were conducted before or after 1958. An ingredient that is considered GRAS
can lose this status because of new evidence casting doubt on its safety, in
which instance it is considered a "food additive" and must be approved by
the FDA under the tests applied to other food additives.
Prior Sanctioned Substances include both intentional ingredients of processed
foods that were approved by the FDA or the U.S. Department of Argiculture
prior to 1958, and unintentional ingredients that migrate into food that were
approved by those agencies before 1958. Such substances have been "grandfathered"
by the Food Additives Amendment. They are therefore exempted from the
food additive approval requirements, but not exempt from other food safety
provisions of the Act.
Color Additives include all substances intentionally used for the purpose
9
of coloring food.2
Animal drugs and feed additives include substances administered or fed
to food producing animals that may leave residues in human food such as
meat, milk, or eggs. 30
Pesticide residues on raw commodities include substances used to control
crop pests that leave residues on commodities likely to be consumed by humans
without significant further processing. Pesticide residues in processed foods are

28.

29.
30.

"Any poisonous or deleterious substance added to any food, except where such substance is required
in the production thereof or cannot be avoided by good manufacturing practice shall be deemed to
be unsafe for purposes of the application of clause (2)(A) of Section 402(a); but when such substance
is so required or cannot be so avoided, the Secretary shall promulgate regulations limiting the quantity
therein or thereon to such extent as he finds necessary for the protection of public health, and any
quantity exceeding the limits so fixed shall also be deemed to be unsafe for purposes of the application
of clause (2)(A) of Section 402(a). While such a regulation is in effect limiting the quantity of any
such substance in the case of any food, such food shall not, by reason of bearing or containing any
added amount of such substance, be considered to be adulterated within the meaning of clause (1)
of Section 402(a). In determining the quantity of such added substance to be tolerated in or on
different articles of food the Secretary shall take into account the extent to which the use of such
substance is required or cannot be avoided in the production of each such article, and the other ways
in which the consumer may be affected by the same or other poisonous or deleterious substances."
21 U.S.C. § 346 (1976).
21 U.S.C. § 376 (1976).
21 U.S.C. § 360(b) (1976).
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technically food additives, which are either: (a) exempted from the requirement
for food additive approval if they do not exceed the tolerance limits set for
the residues on the raw commodity, or (b) subject to approval by the
Environmental Protection Agency under the Food Additives Amendment if
they do exceed that level. The tolerance level can be set at zero if the scientific
31
data do not justify a higher tolerance.
In addition to the seven categories of substances added to foods, there is
an eighth category consisting of naturally occurring constituents of food. This
small category consists of those substances that are inherent components of
natural agricultural commodities, e.g., nitrites in spinach, safrole in nutmeg,
arsenic in shrimp. Like environmental contaminants, the definition of what is
in this category also is an administrative creature of the FDA. The present
law concerns itself only with substances within this category that are also
"poisonous or deleterious," i.e., toxic at some level of exposure but which do
32
not ordinarily make foods containing them injurious to health.
These categories have been laid down like successive layers of sedimentary
rock over the years as various problems have emerged with amendments made
to the law in response. The result is confusion; not only to the consuming
public but often to lawyers, legislators, and administrators alike. There are a
number of serious problems caused by this kind of uncoordinated approach to
substances added to foods. For example, nitrites are regulated both as additives
and as prior sanctioned substances, depending upon whether or not they were
approved for use prior to the Food Additive Amendment. There are some
categories of substances, the unavoidable contaminants, where the FDA may
now make risk/benefit decisions, and others, food additives, where the FDA
may not. Furthermore, there is no distinction as to how or at what rate a
banned substance is to be removed from the market. 33 Perhaps the most
difficult problem revolves around the ban on carcinogenic food additives whose
hazards are due to small amounts of contaminating constituents or residues.
In the past forty years or so there has been what might be called an analytical
revolution. In that period, the minimum amount of material that can be
routinely detected and quantified has diminished by as much as seven orders
of magnitude. This is an enormous advance in the power of resolution, and
certainly has added to our store of scientific knowledge. Unfortunately, the
process also highlights areas of scientific ignorance. For when we are routinely
able to detect parts per billion of a contaminant, we have to ask ourselves if
we really comprehend what these minute residues mean. This is no academic

31.
32.

33.

21 U.S.C. § 346(a) (1976).
"A food shall be deemed to be adulterated - (a)(1) If it bears or contains any added or poisonous
or deleterious substance which may render it injurious to health; but in case the substance is not an
added substance such food shall not be considered adulterated under this clause if the quantity of
such substance in such food does not ordinarily render it injurious to health .
21 U.S.C.
§ 342(a)(1) (1976).
Administrative provisions for banning different classes of substances differ, e.g., a GRAS ingredient
or a provisionally listed color can virtually be banned overnight by order of the Commissioner. A
"permanently" listed color is subject to an evidentiary hearing before a ban can be effected. Practically,
orders may undergo court challenge, and in any event, actual removal from the market is subject to
enforcement discretion, based upon considerations such as degree of hazard and disruption of food
supply.
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question in regard to those provisions of the FD&C Act that were designed
for a zero tolerance for carcinogens at a time when zero was, due to the
limitations of detection, a far higher and quite possibly biologically more
significant value.
Indeed, the debate over the significance of minute traces of carcinogens
has itself become a forcing event placing added pressure on present food safety
policy.
While scientists agree that there is a dose/response relationship to carcinogens,
i.e., the more of a carcinogen that is consumed, the greater the likelihood that
cancer will result, there is disagreement about the response to very small doses
or amounts of ingested carcinogens. Theoretically, some cancer will be produced
by even the smallest amount, and this theory lends support to the Delaney
Clause(s). There are many scientists who hold the view that, as a practical
matter, there is a threshold below which minute quantities of carcinogens are
biologically insignificant. The explicit prohibitions contained in the FD&C Act
directed at the use of carcinogenic food and color additives, however, prevent
distinguishing between carcinogens on the basis of potency or on the basis of
possible thresholds and requires that all carcinogenic risks be treated equally.
This latter form of scientific absolutism by legislative fiat has begun to seem
less viable as risk assessment techniques have permitted some initial, rough
distinctions among carcinogens on the basis of potency, extent of exposure,
34
and other variables.
The analytical revolution is permitting science to identify the presence of
carcinogens in foods at an increasing rate. Moreover, the science of toxicology
has also developed new tools and resolving power to identify carcinogenic
potential in food substances. Because of these factors, if the FD&C Act were
interpreted as requiring the ban of such substances, we could well endanger
significant elements of the food supply. 35 Improved scientific processes will also
have a dramatic impact on the availability of many packaging materials
(especially the plastics) as it becomes increasingly possible to detect molecular
migration from such materials. The inflexibility of current law will also have
an impact on the availability of many chemical additives now approved, since
these substances are sometimes synthesized by chemical processes that result
in the presence of minute quantities of carcinogenic impurities. Modern
technology in food production and distribution involves some highly complex
materials and processes; chemical extraction and synthesis are commonplace
activities in efficient manufacturing operations.
There are other difficulties with any of the absolutist approaches that are
now beginning to emerge. For example, if a substance shown to cause cancer
in laboratory animals seemed unlikely to cause cancer in humans because
animals metabolize the substance in a significantly different way from humans,
a literal reading of the statute would make it very difficult to employ this

34.
35.

44 Fed. Reg. 60038 (1979).
"Unresolved Issues in the Conflict Between Individual Freedom and Government Control of Food
Safety," a paper presented by former FDA General Counsel Peter Barton Hutt at the Conference on
Public Control of Environmental Health Hazzards, New York Academy of Sciences, New York, New
York, June 29, 1978 and contained in Food Safety: Where Are We? Committee on Agriculture,
Nutrition, and Forestry, U.S. Senate, July 1979.
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distincton. And, as raised in the case of nitrites, a substance suspected of
causing cancer in animals may also provide an important health benefit
(protection against botulism). Under current law, a balancing of these benefits
against the health risks is not permitted for food additives. If this occured
with substances that are essential nutrients, it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to deal with the problem under current law. Such an occurrence
is not unreasonably remote. For example, Vitamins A and D have been
demonstrated to be toxic under high levels of consumption. Indeed, Vitamin
A is considered teratogenic at certain levels. Selenium, an essential nutrient,
is associated with increased cancer-causation in laboratory tests; 36 other
metals, essential in small amounts, may be similarly suspect as additional
scientific investigation is undertaken.
There is, of course, much science does not know about carcinogens and
the carcinogenic process. It is still necessary to approach any proposed addition
of a carcinogen to the food supply with great caution. The task, however, is
not one of choosing either/or. Rather, the task is how to retain a conservative
approach to carcinogenic substances while introducing an element of flexibility
and discretion sufficient to permit decisions that are scientifically sound but
more realistic. This is necessary in a world where, we are discovering, it
is becoming increasingly likely that foods may contain some carcinogenic
constituents.
THE PUBLIC POLICY OPTIONS
There have been a variety of proposals advanced to provide greater flexibility
while still protecting the public health against the addition of carcinogens to
the food supply, including: the use of quantitative risk assessment; 37 the
recommendations contained in Part II of the Institute of Medicine/National
Academy of Science Report (IOM/NAS); 38 and various Congressional proposals.
Quantitative Risk Assessment
Dr. Arthur C. Upton, the former Director of the National Cancer Institute
said that quantitative risk assessment should not be used as a "primary basis"
for the regulation of carcinogens. 39 This statement, according to Dr. Upton,
does not mean that quantitative risk assessment should be regarded as worthless
for evaluating the consequence of exposure to carcinogens. Neither, according
to Dr. Upton, should the use of qualitative risk assessment be shunned in the
36.

Selenium is an approved additive for animal feed, notwithstanding the association. The FDA reasoned
that selenium caused physiological change in the liver, that this change was dose-related, and that the
change led to cancer. This mechanism of cancer causation was interpreted to be different from the
"induce cancer" standard of the Delaney Clause.
37. One approach, called "Sensitivity of the Method," deals with assays of drug residues in edible animals'
tissue. This approach recognizes that for all assay methods the limit of detection is somewhere above
zero, and that, for all cases, there will likely be some molecular amount of residue. Since it is
impossible to know if and when a state of absolute zero has been attained by an animal receiving a
carcinogen, the FDA had two choices: (I) not to allow use of carcinogens in food-producing animals
(which is not the intent of the law); or (2) to provide an operational definition of "no residue" (the
acceptable alternative). To provide this definition, the FDA sought to adopt an approach permitting
it to consider the carcinogenic potency of each individual compound and require methods that can
measure the level dictated by carcinogenic potency. An important element of this approach is the
selection of a uniform, maximum level of risk of cancer from potential residues; a one-in-one-million
lifetime risk has been proposed. Rule-making is still in process. See 44 Fed. Reg. 17070 (1979).
38. Institute of Medicine/National Academy of Sciences Report, supra note 8, at 3.
39. Carter, How to Assess Cancer Risk, 204 Science 811 (1979).
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regulatory decisionmaking process. As expressed in a September 21, 1979 joint
statement by Dr. Upton, and Dr. Norton Nelson, Director, Institute of
Environmental Medicine, New York University Medical Center, "Society
sometimes finds itself in a situation where choices must be made between the
demonstrated benefits of certain chemicals or processes and the risks they
pose. Clearly, when non-carcinogenic alternatives are available the choice is
clear; the dilemma arises when such options are not accessible. In such instances
it is imperative that all relevant evidence be carefully analyzed and examined
in respect to its weight and reliability, including, crude though they may be,
quantitative estimates. The limitations of quantitative risk assessment are well
recognized in the scientific community and have been discussed by one of
us. 40 Such estimates can not be the exclusive or primary basis for the final
judgement, but they contribute to the ultimate decision to the extent justified
by their reliability. Valid evidence is better than pure guesses. Current procedures
may not be optimal; constructive ways of improving them should be encouraged."
IOM/NAS Recommendations
In Part II of its Report, 4 1 the National Academy of Sciences surveys the
area of Federal food regulation and proceeds to develop a methodology within
which to discuss future modification to the system. The major areas addressed
are: food safety, risk assessment, benefit assessment, current and alternative
policies, and strategies.
In regard to these concerns, the Report recommends adopting:
(1) a single safety standard for all foodstuffs, food additives, and food
contaminants;
(2) ways by which officials responsible for administering the policy may be
accorded the flexibility necessary to weigh benefits and risks, including economic
and social consequences;
(3) ways by which the FDA may choose from a full range of options from
no action to warning to selective to complete ban; and
(4) a classification scheme providing a range of low, moderate, and high risk
materials.
In addition, the IOM/NAS Report recommends that the Delaney Clause(s)
be abandoned.
Various Legislative Initiatives
Congressman James G. Martin (R. N.C.), Congressman Thomas Foley (D.
Wash.) and Senator Richard S. Schweiker (R. Pa.) have introduced bills to
revise the food safety laws insofar as the regulation of food additives is
concerned. The Martin Bill 42 which has some 30 cosponsors, would require
that the risks and benefits of food additives be considered and that an additive
be approved if the benefits outweigh the risks or if the risk to humans is low
considering the overall safety and reliability of the food supply. Under
Congressman Martin's bill, the risks of an additive would be weighed against

40. Nelson, Comments on Extrapolation of Cancer Response from High Dose to Low Dose, 22
Environmental Health Perspectives 93 (1978).
41. Institute of Medicine/National Academy of Sciences Report, supra note 8, at 3.
42. H.R. 3778, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
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the benefits listed in the order of priority to be given to them: (a) health
risks and benefits; (b) nutritional needs and benefits and the nutritional value,
cost availability and acceptability of food; (c) environmental effects; and (d)
interests of the general public. Under this bill, benefits could override risks,
even significant ones.
The Foley bill, 43 which has no cosponsors, would simply revoke the Delaney
Clause. When it was introduced, Congressman Foley, Chairman of the House
Agriculture Committee, stated that he had not yet decided that the clause
should be revoked, but felt strongly that discussion of that possibility is
important and overdue.
The Schweiker bill, 44 which has two cosponsors, is similar to the Martin
bill. It would require risk/benefit decisionmaking and consideration of the
same benefits that Congressman Martin's proposal would require (and in the
same order).
Implications of Monsanto Co. v. Kennedy.

A recent decision 4 5 of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has introduced a new element into the administration of the FD&C
Act that is likely to heighten the pressure for statutory revision of food safety
standards. In September 1977, FDA Commissioner Donald Kennedy decided
that acrylonitrile copolymer beverage bottles were food additives and could
not be approved as safe under Section 409 of the FD&C Act.
Monsanto appealed this decision, the principal issue being whether the
bottles may indeed be classified as food additives. It argued (1) that in order
for a packaging substance to be judged a food additive the migration from it
must be toxicologically significant; (2) that in order for a packaging material
to be judged a food additive migration from it must be actually detected, not
merely projected; (3) that the new bottle was not a food additive; and (4)
that the FDA had acted in a discriminatory and inconsistent manner in treating
the acrylonitrile bottle as a food additive.
The Court rejected these and other arguments, remanded the case to
provide for reconsideration by the FDA, and went on to say:
For the component element of the definition [of 'food additive'] to be satisfied,
Congress must have intended the Commissioner to determine with a fair degree
of confidence that a substance migrates into food in more than insignificant
amounts. We do not suggest that the substance must be toxicologically
significant; the aspect is subsumed by the safety element of the definition.
Congress has granted the Commissioner a limited but important area of
discretion. Although as a matter of theory the statutory net might sweep
within the term 'food additive' a single molecule of any substance that finds
its way into food, the Commissioner is not required to determine that the
component element of the definition has been satisfied by such an exiguous
showing. The Commissioner has latitude under particular circumstances to
find migration 'insignificant' even giving full weight to the public health and

43.
44.
45.

H.R. 12, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
S. 587, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978).
Monsanto Co. v. Kennedy, No. 77-2023 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 6, 1979).
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welfare concerns that must inform his discretion. Thus, the Commissioner may
determine based on the evidence before him that the level of migration into
food of a particular chemical is so negligible as to present no public health
or safety concerns, even to assure a wide margin of safety.
It is important to note that the court indicated that the Commissioner is
not required to exempt a de minimis substance from the food additive definition;
he may do so as a matter of his discretion. Such discretionary authority,
however, is not unlimited. If a Commissioner does exercise this discretionary
authority and does exempt a de minimis substance from the definition of food
additive, it will be necessary for him to state the reasons why this limited
exemption authority has been used.
In the event of a refusal to exempt a de minimis substance, the second
limitation on his authority arises because there is a narrow, but real, power
of judicial review. As the Court put it, however, "Absent a showing of bad
faith or other extraordinary circumstances, a court will not consider meritorious
the claim that the Commissioner has abused his discretion in declining to
exercise his exemption authority for de minimis situations. This is an area of
decision by its nature committed to the informed discretion of the Commissioner."
The essence of the Court's decision, and of the importance of that decision
to food safety policy, is that while the Court did not agree with Monsanto's
contention that toxicological significance must exist in order for a substance
to be construed as a food additive, the FDA has discretionary authority to
consider toxicological insignificance as a basis for exempting a substance from
such status.
Under this interpretation of the Court, the definition of de minimis is
extended from "very small" to "toxicologically insignificant." Whether this
interpretation of law will (or can) be broadly applied has yet to be determined.
It is not unreasonable speculation, however, that further litigation will arise
if the FDA attempts to apply the approach (a challenge by supporters of a
conservative food safety policy), or if the FDA declines to apply the approach
(a challenge by food additive petitioners seeking its use). In short, it appears
that events still in the making are building a foundation for a more realistic
food safety policy; a major court test of existing law confirming the Monsanto
interpretation or, ideally, a legislative initiative is needed to set the foundation
in place.
SUGGESTED APPROACHES
Whatever proposals are finally translated into legislative initiatives, it seems
clear that, as a practical matter, legislation designed to put food safety standards
on a realistic footing should not attempt to redo the entire universe of food
policy but, rather, focus on the objectives of clarification, conservation, and
continuity. Having raised the issue, it seems only fair to suggest some specific
approaches.
It is obvious in regard to the present convoluted system of classification
that "anyone who isn't confused, isn't thinking clearly." We have arrived at
a point where complexity has become so great that the system is beginning
to defeat itself. The loss of understanding has been followed by a loss of
public credibility and public confidence. Resolution of this serious problem is
not beyond the scope of human invention. Two types of change would be
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required: redefinition of food categories and adoption of acceptable risk criteria.
The first change could be attained by establishing three simplified, mutually
exclusive food categories, each with a uniform regulatory approach. Thus, it
would be possible to divide food regulated by the FDA into (a) traditional
foods; (b) food contaminants; and (c) food additives. The scheme should be
comprehensive so that all foods would be classifiable into one of these categories.
Under this simple system of categorization, continuity of the food supply
would be achieved through considering as traditional foods the basic food
commodities, as well as naturally occurring poisonous or deleterious substances,
i.e., harmful substances that are inherent constituents of food; both natural
and artificial (i.e., synthesized and chemically indistinguishable from natural
ones) spices and flavors; and essential nutrients at the levels they occur in
food. This category would involve a regulatory approach in which the burden
of proof would be on the government to prove risk before a substance
could be banned. This approach now exists for some foods under Section
402(a)(1) 4 6 and would be continued, although redefinition of the category
would be necessary to include substances not now included. A standard of
"not ordinarily injurious to health" would apply to this category.
Food contaminants would include environmental and accidental contaminants
that are not inherent constituents of foods and are not deliberately added to
food (e.g., PCB, aflatoxin). In regard to this category, the regulatory approach
would require the FDA to assess the risk and establish tolerances in the same
manner as it does now for unavoidable contaminants under Section 406. 47 The
Delaney concept would not apply because banning the substance would also
ban the food.
Finally, the food additive category would include everything now classified
as food additives, as well as GRAS and prior sanctioned substances, color
additives, and nutrients above normal levels and synthetic foods. (Obviously,
the current GRAS definition would require revision to reclassify those traditional
food substances fitting the definition, e.g., salt, sugar, vinegar, coffee, etc.)
The regulatory approach would require the FDA to review evidence of food
additive safety before use.
With regard to the second type of change, a modified Delaney concept
would apply, built on the framework of rebuttable presumption and consideration
of health benefits/risks. Carcinogenic substances would be prohibited from use
as additives unless a showing of acceptable risk could be made using risk
assessment techniques or by showing, with appropriate scientific evidence, that
the carcinogenicity of a substance in test animals may have different effects
in man; or that a threshold for its effects can be shown; or that other valid
scientific reasons exist for rejecting a carcinogenicity finding in laboratory
tests. Further, approval of an additive could be permitted if direct health
benefits could be shown for a substance that might outweigh its health risks,
e.g., for preservatives that prevent botulism.
It can be argued that the suggested approach to food categories is internally
inconsistent and not likely to resolve all current problems. In particular, it is
held that it is not logical to distinguish between additives and contaminants
or between deliberately added substances and inadvertently added substances,
46.
47.

21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(i) (1976).
21 U.S.C. § 346 (1976).
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e.g., between adding saccharin to soft drinks and adding aflatoxin - contaminated
peanuts to peanut butter. 48 This interpretation would classify contaminated
peanuts as a food additive. Certainly, this would be a narrow and technical-legal
interpretation of the term "food additive." It would however, overlook the
functionality criterion contained in the current definition of a food additive;
aflatoxin, unlike saccharin, serves no function.
There is a difference, as suggested in the de minimus decision of Monsanto, in adding a substance (peanuts) containing a minute amount of a toxic,
contaminating constituent (aflatoxin) and intentionally adding the constituent
itself (saccharin) in relatively large amounts. We do not agree with the narrow
interpretation of "food additive," and believe the three-category approach is
workable, although it is an arguable issue and one that may require modifying
the definition of food additive for efficient application of the scheme. However,
the three-category approach suggested satisfies a more fundamental need by
providing the flexibility to approve use of additives that satisfy acceptable risk
criteria.
Regardless of how one chooses to treat a substance (intentional versus
unintentional additives), there would be a basis for permitting its use if it
meets the standards for acceptable risk. Peanut butter, saccharin, nitrites,
acrylonitrile, and most other problem substances would be readily classifiable
and manageable under the scheme outlined above; approvability, of course,
would depend on the standard of acceptable risk.
Doggedly following the logic of a narrow and technical interpretation of
"food additive" leads inexorably to the conclusion that everything should be
treated as a food additive and that there are no solutions to the present
dilemma. This should not be our goal. Rather, we should seek ways to make
the food safety system credible and manageable.
Certainly, an everything-is-a-food-additive result is unmanageable if the
requirement for pre-clearance before marketing is to continue. Alternatively,
marketing pre-clearance could be eliminated and the burdens placed on users
to self-determine safe use in accordance with uniform standards and on the
government to establish the standards and police compliance with them. We
suspect this would be too radical a change, especially since we are still
developing scientific standards and procedures for evaluating safety.
It is interesting to explore the additive definition issue with other examples,
e.g., packaging materials or color additives. Substances in these categories are
formulated by complex chemical processes involving materials which are
converted into other forms, or which are merely intermediates serving as
catalysts or extractives and which are removed from the end product. Removal
or conversion usually is not complete and residual traces remain. In addition,
other substances, such as reaction products, may be formed as a result. How
should these trace residues or reaction products be treated? Current practice

48.

See Hutt, Hair Dye Regs: A Narrowing of FDA "No Risk" Policy, Legal Times of Washington,
(Nov. 5, 1979) and Hutt, "Monsanto": Important for Food, Drug, Cosmetic Problems, Legal Times
of Washington, (Nov. 26, 1979.)
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would treat them as additives.
Alternatively, under either current law or the proposal outlined here, they
could be treated as unavoidable contaminants. A new administrative policy,
an "inherent constituent" treatment, would have to be extended to man-made
substances as well as those produced by nature. This would be consistant with
the de minimis theory in Monsanto, and provide a risk assessment basis using
the current application of Section 406 for handling some difficult problems.
In short, we believe the suggested classification scheme and risk assessment
approach will make food safety regulation a manageable function and will
bring rationality to an admittedly irrational and difficult enterprise.
In order to gain some flexibility while maintaining a conservative approach
toward carcinogenic food additives as redefined following the new category
previously suggested, it seems important to avoid making arbitrary choices
disguised by the rationale of risk/benefit. It is difficult to quantify risks and
benefits of foods in a meaningful and comparable way. To employ any scheme
that involves generalized assessment of benefits for food additives would extend
the job of regulation far beyond its present scope and far beyond what the
proponents of risk/benefit consider to be the legitimate function of a regulatory
agency. In this regard, it is worth noting that when the Food Additives
Amendment to the FD&C Act was being considered, food industry representatives
opposed any consideration of benefits beyond that of considering whether an
additive achieves its intended effect 49 and for goud reason. If the FDA were
to consider benefits, it might conclude, for example, that the addition of a
new emulsifier to the food supply, even in the absence of demonstrated risk,
could not be accepted since the marginal benefit could not compensate for
the potential risk. Indeed, an agency empowered to consider benefits as well
as risks would be justified in exercising its authority into a retrospective
consideration of all approved additives, eliminating those whose benefits seem
questionable in the light of subsequent approvals. It is difficult to believe that
at a time when government is beginning to turn away from economic regulation,
economic benefit consideration would become part of the food safety regulatory
process. Imposing governmental value judgments in what is a highly subjective
area is simply asking for trouble. In addition, experience in administering the
current statute strongly argues against the concept of generalized risk/benefit
consideration.

49.

Cooper, The Role of Regulatory Agencies in Risk-Benefit Decision-Making, 33 Food Drug Cos. L.
J. 755 (1978).
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Under the present system, FDA decisions involving food substances with
significant economic consequences or public interest impact have been accompanied
by extensive administrative proceedings and litigation. There is no reason to
believe that safety decisions will become any easier to make or less controversial,
that the due process associated with such decisions will be briefer, or that
decisions affecting important food substances will be less contested than now.
Adding a benefit dimension to the decision would simply result in more data
to be evaluated and contested. The burden imposed on both government and
industry would make for an extremely costly and time-consuming approval
process.
CONCLUSION
One thing should be clear: there is no practical application of absolute
safety in our food regulatory scheme. Further, public and private resources
for assuring food safety are limited; extensive pre-market testing of food
substances already is straining our scientific and technical capacity. Therefore,
we must accommodate some degree of risk. It is important that we formalize
the criteria for risk acceptance in a statutory way; the issue is important and
not likely to go away. Resolution is needed if we are to lessen uncertainties
and put our food safety policies on a contemporary basis.

